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Abstract
This paper investigates a novel unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) secure communication system
with the assistance of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs), where an UAV and a ground user
communicate with each other, while an eavesdropper tends to wiretap their information. Due to the
limited capacity of UAVs, a RIS is applied to further improve the quality of the secure communications.
The time division multiple access (TDMA) protocol is applied for the communications between the UAV
and the ground user, namely, the downlink (DL) and the uplink (UL) communications. In particular,
the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channels is assumed to be imperfect. We aim
to maximize the average worst-case secrecy rate by the robust joint design of the UAV’s trajectory,
RIS’s passive beamforming, and transmit power of the legitimate transmitters. It is challenging to solve
the Joint UL/DL optimization problem due to its non-convexity. To this end, we develop an efficient
algorithm based on the alternating optimization (AO) technique. Specifically, the formulated problem
is divided into three sub-problems, and the successive convex approximation (SCA), S-Procedure, and
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) are applied to tackle these non-convex sub-problems. Numerical results
demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can considerably improve the average secrecy rate compared
with the benchmark algorithms, and also confirm the robustness of the proposed algorithm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of the number of network devices, it is expected that the overall
mobile data traffic will reach astonishingly up to 77 exabytes per month by 2022 [1], which
undoubtedly poses a tremendous challenge for current mobile communication networks. To meet
these explosive demands, innovative wireless transmission technologies have been investigated
in the past few years, such as the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [2]–[4], reconfigurable
intelligent surfaces (RISs) [5]–[9] and so on. Due to UAVs’ high mobility, they can be flexibly
deployed to enhance the communication quality, while conventional terrestrial base stations (BSs)
only serve the ground users in a fixed area. In addition, UAVs usually fly at a high altitude
compared with the terrestrial infrastructures, which makes the transmission links between the
UAV and the ground devices line-of-sight (LoS) dominated [10]. Thanks to these advantages,
UAVs are expected to play a key role in beyond fifth generation (B5G) and sixth generation
(6G) networks [11], [12]. In the majority of research on UAV communications, the secrecy issue
is one of the key research aeras, in which authors focus on enhancing the secure communication
quality via the joint optimization of the UAV trajectory and communication resource allocation.
For instance, the authors in [4] considered a simplified secure UAV communication system
and maximized the average secrecy rate of the system via joint trajectory and power control
design. The authors in [13] applied the UAV as a jammer to transmit interfering signals to
the eavesdropper, so as to improve the secrecy rate performance. A novel UAV-enabled secure
communication system with cooperative jamming has been studied in [14]–[17], where one UAV
as the legitimate transmitter sent confidential data to the users, while the other UAV as the jammer
delivered artificial noise (AN) to the eavesdroppers to weaken the quality of the eavesdropping
channels. In particular, in [15]–[17], the scenario of multiple users and eavesdroppers was
investigated, and authors aimed at maximizing the minimum secrecy rate among the legitimate
users by jointly optimizing the UAV trajectory and corresponding communication resource
allocation. In addition, the robust trajectory and transmit power design was studied in [18], and
the S-Procedure method was used to efficiently solve the location uncertainty of the eavesdropper.
Benefiting from improving the propagation environment and enhancing the signal strength,
RISs have been widely investigated as the technology enabler for realizing smart radio envi-
3ronments in the near future [19]–[22]. In general, a RIS is comprised of energy-efficient and
cost-effective reconfigurable passive elements. Each element of the RIS can induce a manageable
phase shift on the incident signal by using a smart controller at the RIS. Hence, with the aid
of a RIS, the signals from different communication links can be added coherently at the desired
receiver to enhance the received signal energy or destructively at unscheduled receiver to avoid
the information leakage [23]. This is also called passive beamforming. Due to the peculiar
property of modifying the wireless propagation environment, RIS-assisted secure communication
systems have attracted extensive attention [24]–[28]. In [24], the authors investigated a simplified
RIS-aided secure communication system, where the BS delivered the confidential data to the
user, while the eavesdropper intended to intercept the legitimate information. The RIS was
utilized to enhance the quality of the legitimate links and weaken that of the wiretap links.
By applying semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and Gaussian randomization methods, the authors
maximized the achievable secrecy rate via jointly optimizing passive beamforming and transmit
beamforming with AN. Since the SDR methods may not provide a rank-one solution, the
majorization minimization (MM) technique [25] and manifold optimization theory [26] were
used to obtain a rank-one solution. The robust and secure RIS-assisted communication systems
have been studied in [27], [28]. In [27], by robust joint design of active beamforming and passive
beamforming, the worst case of achievable secrecy rate was maximized under the colluding and
non-colluding eavesdropping scenarios. The authors in [28] considered a secure wireless system
comprised of multiple ground users, eavesdroppers, and RISs. It was assumed that the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channels was not perfectly known at the BS. Hence,
a joint and robust design of the beamforming (including active beamforming at the BS and passive
beamforming at the RISs) and the AN covariance matrix was proposed to maximize the system
sum-rate under a given information leakage threshold.
From the above discussion, UAVs can provide LoS dominant transmission links with the
ground users, thanks to their high mobility, while RISs can achieve passive beamforming by
adjusting their reflecting elements smartly. Recently, the design of RIS-assisted UAV commu-
nication systems has attracted increasing attention [29]–[35]. In [29], a RIS was utilized to
assist the UAV relay system, and the simulation results demonstrated that deploying RISs could
significantly improved the coverage and reliability of UAV communication systems. In [30],
the UAV was used as the mobile BS to serve the ground user with the assistance of the RIS.
The authors aimed maximizing the average achievable rate by the joint optimization of the
4UAV trajectory and RIS’s passive beamforming, and derived a closed-form solution of the RIS’s
phase-shift matrix for any given UAV trajectory. In [31], a RIS was placed on the UAV to assist
the user whose LoS path is blocked. Then, an efficient algorithm based on the reinforcement
learning technique was proposed to solve the DL transmission capacity maximization problem.
Similarly, in [32], the UAV equipped with a RIS was leveraged to achieve the uplink secure
communication. Based on the reinforcement learning method, the authors of [33] proposed
a deep Q-network (DQN)-based algorithm to design the UAV’s trajectory and RIS’s passive
beamforming to maximize the weighted fairness and data rate among all users. Additionally,
the authors in [34] accounted for multiple RISs and a multi-antenna UAV, and maximized
the received power by jointly optimizing passive beamforming, active beamforming, and the
UAVâA˘Z´s trajectory. The authors in [35] studied a UAV-assisted RIS symbiotic radio system,
where the UAV helped multiple RISs achieve their own information transmission. Based on
statistical CSI, the problems of maximizing the minimum average rate and the weight sum rate
over all RISs were solved, respectively, by joint design of the UAV trajectory, RISs’ passive
beamforming, and RIS scheduling.
It is observed that among the current works on RIS-aided UAV communications, there exists
very limited research on the design of secure communication systems. Furthermore, in the
existing RIS-aided UAV secure communication systems, it is assumed that the perfect CSI of
the eavesdropping channels is known. This assumption is not reasonable since the eavesdroppers
always avoid being detected by the legitimate transmitters, so as to intercept the legitimate
information transmission successfully. Motivated by this, in this paper, we investigate a novel
RIS-aided UAV secure communication system as shown in Fig. 1, where the UAV flies over a
given flight period to serve the ground user, and the ground user also uploads some messages
to the UAV, while a potential eavesdropper intends to wiretap their communications. However,
in complex urban environment, the quality of the secure information transmission may be poor.
Thus, a RIS is leveraged to enhance the communication quality of the legitimate links and
weaken that of the eavesdropping links. Specifically, the entire flight duration is divided into
abundant flight time slots. We assume that the time division multiple access (TDMA) protocol
is applied. As a result, we divide each time slot into two parts, i.e., one for the downlink
(DL) transmission and the other for the uplink (UL) transmission, where the UAV and the
ground user are the legitimate transmitter (receiver) and receiver (transmitter), respectively. Since
the eavesdropper always avoids to be detected as possible as it can, accurate estimates of the
5CSI of the eavesdropping links are usually not available. Hence, we assume imperfect CSI
acquisition of the eavesdropping channels and use a deterministic model [36] to describe the
CSI uncertainty. Under these assumptions, a robust joint design of the UAV’s trajectory, RIS’s
passive beamforming, and the transmit power control of the legitimate transmitter is formulated as
a non-convex joint UL/DL optimization problem for maximizing the average worst-case secrecy
rate. The considered problem is difficult to solve due to its non-convexity. We first address its
non-smooth objective function and transform the formulated problem into an equivalent problem
based on the results in [4]. For the reformulated problem, however the corresponding optimization
variables are coupled, which leads to a non-convex optimization problem. To tackle this difficulty,
we propose an efficient algorithm based on the alternating optimization (AO) technique. More
precisely, the reformulated problem is divided into three sub-problems: 1) transmit power control
design for a given UAV trajectory and passive beamforming design; 2) passive beamforming
design for a given UAV trajectory and transmit power control design; 3) UAV trajectory design
for a given passive beamforming and transmit power control design. For sub-problem 1, we
compute the optimal transmit power control design according to the special structure of the
objective function. Then, for sub-problem 2, we utilize the S-procedure and successive convex
approximation (SCA) techniques to handle the CSI uncertainty and the non-concave objective
function, respectively. Finally, it is challenging to tackle the difficulties resulting from the CSI
uncertainty and the small-scale fading component of the channel between the UAV and RIS.
To cope with these difficulties, we use the UAV trajectory of the previous iteration to design
the current small-scale fading component of the channel between the UAV and RIS and worst-
case setup of the eavesdropping links. Then, the SCA method is applied to solve it efficiently.
Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed algorithm can significantly increase the average
secrecy rate, as compared to benchmark algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system
model and problem formulation. In Section III, we propose efficient algorithms based on the AO
technique to solve the formulated joint UL/DL optimization problem. The simulation results are
illustrated in Section IV. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
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Fig. 1. A RIS-assisted UAV secure communication system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a UAV-enabled communication system where a rotary-wing
UAV and a ground user communicate with each other, while an eavesdropper attempts to intercept
their legitimate communications. Due to the limited capacity of the UAV, the performance of
such secure communication may be low. Thus, we use a building-mounted RIS to assist the
secure data transmission. Without loss of generality, we assume that all communication nodes
are placed in the three dimensional (3D) Cartesian coordinate system. The ground user’s and
the eavesdropper’s horizontal coordinates are denoted by wG = [xG, yG]
T and wE = [xE , yE]
T ,
respectively. The UAV is assumed to fly at a constant altitude denoted by zU for a given flight
period denoted by T. For tractability, T is discretized into N time slots, namely, T = Nδt, where
δt is the time slot length. Therefore, the UAV’s time-varying horizontal trajectory is denoted
as the sequence q[n] = [x[n], y[n]]T , n ∈ N , {1, · · · , N}, which should meet the following
7mobility constraints:
||q[n+ 1]− q[n]||2 ≤ D2, n = 1, · · · , N − 1, (1a)
||q[N ]− qF ||2 ≤ D2,q[1] = q0, (1b)
where q0 and qF are the predetermined initial and final horizontal locations of the UAV,
respectively, D = vmaxδt is the maximum horizontal distance that the UAV can fly in δt,
and vmax is the maximum speed of the UAV. We assume that the UAV, the ground user,
and the eavesdropper are equipped with a single-antenna for each. The RIS is equipped with
M = Mx×Mz reflecting elements, forming an Mx×Mz uniform rectangular array (URA), and
a controller that can intelligently adjust the phase shift of each element. The RIS is located in
the x-z plane, and its altitude and horizontal coordinates are denoted by zR and wR = [xR, yR]
T ,
respectively. The diagonal phase-shift matrix for the RIS in the time slot n is denoted by
Θ[n] = diag{ejθ1[n], ejθ2[n], · · · , ejθM [n]}, where θi[n] ∈ [0, 2π) , i ∈ M , {1, · · · ,M}, is the
phase shift of the ith reflecting element within a single time slot.
To achieve the mutual communication between the UAV and the ground user, we assume that
the TDMA protocol is applied for them. Specifically, we utilize a weighted factor w ∈ [0, 1] to
divide a single flight time slot into two parts: wδt for the DL transmission in which the UAV
serves the ground user, and (1− w) δt for the UL transmission in which the ground user uploads
data that the UAV intends to harvest. The details are specified as follows.
1) DL Transmission: In this case, the UAV and the ground node serve as the legitimate
transmitter and receiver, respectively. Let p[n] denote the transmit power of the UAV in time
slot n. In practice, p[n] is usually subject to both average and peak limits over time, denoted by
P¯ and Ppeak, respectively. Thus, the transmit power constraints are expressed as
1
N
N∑
n=1
p[n] ≤ P¯ , (2a)
0 ≤ p[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n. (2b)
We assume the Rician fading channel model for all communication links. Hence, the small-
scale fading component of the link from the UAV to the RIS (U-R link) in the nth time slot,
denoted by hUR[n] ∈ CM×1, can be expressed as
hUR[n] =
√
βUR
1 + βUR
hLoSUR [n] +
√
1
1 + βUR
hNLoSUR , (3)
8where βUR is the Rician factor of the U-R link, h
LoS
UR [n] is the deterministic LoS component,
and hNLoSUR is the non-LoS (NLoS) component which is modeled by the circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian (CSCG) distribution with zero mean and unit variance. In particular, hLoSUR [n]
depends on the UAV trajectory at time slot n, and it can be expressed as [37], [38]
hLoSUR [n] = ay[n]⊗ ax[n], (4)
where
ax[n] =
[
1, e−j
2pi
λ
d cosφUR[n] sinϕUR[n], ..., e−j
2pi
λ
(Mx−1)d cosφUR[n] sinϕUR[n]
]T
,
ay[n] =
[
1, e−j
2pi
λ
d sinφUR[n] sinϕUR[n], ..., e−j
2pi
λ
(Mz−1)d sinφUR[n] sinϕUR[n]
]T
,
sinφUR[n] sinϕUR[n] =
zU − zR
dUR[n]
, cosφUR[n] sinϕUR[n] =
xR − x[n]
dUR[n]
,
dUR[n] =
√
(zU − zR)2 + ||q[n]−wR||2 denotes the distance between the UAV and the RIS
in the nth time slot, φUR[n] and ϕUR[n] represent the azimuth and elevation angles of the LoS
component in time slot n, respectively, d is the antenna separation, and λ is the carrier wavelength.
The small-scale fading components of the links from the RIS to the ground user (R-G link), the
RIS to the eavesdropper (R-E link), the UAV to the ground user (U-G link), and the UAV to
the eavesdropper (U-E link) can be generated with a similar procedure, and they are denoted
as hHRG ∈ C1×M , hHRE ∈ C1×M , hUG ∈ C, and hUE ∈ C, respectively. We use the distance-
dependent path loss model in [39], [40] for the reflecting links, i.e., the links from the UAV to
the ground user via the RIS (U-R-G link) and the UAV to the eavesdropper via the RIS (U-R-E
link), which can be expressed as
LURG[n] =
√
ρ (dUR[n]dRG)
−α and LURE [n] =
√
ρ (dUR[n]dRE)
−α, (5)
where dRG =
√
z2R + ||wR −wG||2, dRE =
√
z2R + ||wR −wE||2, ρ is the path loss at the
reference distance D0 = 1 m, and α is the path loss exponent for the U-R-G and the U-R-E links.
For the direct links, namely, the U-G and the U-E links, the corresponding distance-dependent
path loss models are given by
LUG[n] =
√
ρ (z2U + ||q[n]−wG||2)−
κ
2 , (6)
LUE [n] =
√
ρ (z2U + ||q[n]−wE ||2)−
κ
2 , (7)
where κ is the path loss exponent for the U-G and the U-E links.
9With the above channel models, the received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) of the ground user
and the eavesdropper in the nth time slot can be respectively expressed as
γUG[n] =
p[n]
∣∣LUG[n]hUG + LURG[n]hHRGΘd[n]hUR[n]∣∣2
σ2
, (8)
γUE[n] =
p[n]
∣∣LUE [n]hUE + LURE [n]hHREΘd[n]hUR[n]∣∣2
σ2
, (9)
where Θd[n] = diag{ejθd1 [n], ejθd2 [n], · · · , ejθdM [n]} is the phase-shift matrix of the DL transmission
in the time slot n and σ2 is the noise variance. Thus, the achievable rates in bits/second/Hertz
(bps/Hz) at the ground user and the eavesdropper in time slot n are respectively given by
RUG[n] = log2(1 + γUG[n]), (10a)
RUE [n] = log2(1 + γUE[n]). (10b)
2) UL Transmission: In this case, the ground user and the UAV serve as the legitimate
transmitter and receiver, respectively. Denote by g[n] the transmit power of the ground user in
time slot n. Similarly, g[n] is constrained by an average power limit G¯ and a peak power limit
Gpeak, i.e.,
1
N
N∑
n=1
g[n] ≤ G¯, (11a)
0 ≤ g[n] ≤ Gpeak, ∀n. (11b)
Since the ground user and the eavesdropper are both on the ground, we assume that the eaves-
dropping channel between the ground user and the eavesdropper (G-E link) is modeled as a
Rayleigh fading channel. Thus, the small-scale fading component of the G-E link, denoted by
hGE , is assumed to be a zero-mean and unit-variance CSCG random variable. The distance-
dependent path loss of the G-E link is given by
LGE =
√
ρ (||wG −wE ||2)−
ς
2 , (12)
where ς is the path loss exponent related to the G-E link. Similar to the DL transmission, the
other channels in the UL transmission are assumed to be Rician distribution, and thus, we omit
their specific structures for brevity. The small-scale fading components of the links from the RIS
to the UAV, the ground user to the RIS, and the ground user to the UAV the R-U are denoted
as hHRU [n] ∈ C1×M , hGR ∈ CM×1, hGU ∈ C, respectively. We still use LUG[n] and LURG[n] to
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express the distance-dependent path loss models of the user-RIS-UAV (G-R-U) link and user-
UAV (G-U) link, respectively. Therefore, the received SNRs of the UAV and the eavesdropper
in the nth time slot can be respectively written as
γGU [n] =
g[n]
∣∣LUG[n]hGU + LURG[n]hHRU [n]Θu[n]hGR∣∣2
σ2
, (13)
γGE[n] =
g[n]
∣∣LGEhGE + LGREhHREΘu[n]hGR∣∣2
σ2
, (14)
where
LGRE =
√
ρ [(z2R + ||wR −wG||2) (z2R + ||wR −wE||2)]−
α
2
is the large-scale fading component of the user-RIS-eavesdropper (G-R-E) link, and Θu[n] =
diag{ejθu1 [n], ejθu2 [n], · · · , ejθuM [n]} is the phase-shift matrix of the uplink transmission in the time
slot n. Hence, the achievable rates in bps/Hz from the ground user to the UAV and the eaves-
dropper in time slot n are respectively given by
RGU [n] = log2(1 + γGU [n]), (15a)
RGE [n] = log2(1 + γGE[n]). (15b)
B. CSI Assumption
In general, the legitimate transmitter is able to periodically update and refine the CSI of
the legitimate receiver based on uplink pilots. In addition, some channel estimation techniques
[41]–[43] have been proposed for CSI acquisition in the presence of RISs recently. Based on
these considerations, we assume that the CSI of the legitimate links is perfectly available in a
central controller. However, the eavesdropper usually avoids being detected and tracked by the
legitimate transmitter in order to intercept the legitimate communications. Hence, the estimated
CSI of the eavesdropping channels are usually not accurate at the central controller. For this
reason, we first rewrite γUE[n] and γGE[n] as
γUE[n] =
p[n]
σ2
∣∣hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣2 , (16)
γGE[n] =
g[n]
σ2
∣∣hHE2HE2vu[n]∣∣2 , (17)
where hE1 =
[
hHRE, hUE
]H
, hE2 =
[
hHRE, hGE
]H
, HE1[n] = diag



LURE [n]hUR[n]
LUE [n]



, HE2 =
diag



LGREhGR
LGE



, and vd[n] = [vd1 [n], vd2 [n], · · · , vdM [n], 1]T (vdi [n] = ejθdi [n], ∀n, i). The
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structure of vu[n] is similar to vd[n]. In particular, the links related to the eavesdropper are
hE1 and hE2. Then, we utilize a deterministic model to characterize the CSI uncertainty. The
uncertainties of the eavesdropping channels in the DL and UL transmissions are respectively
modeled as
hE1 = h¯E1 +∆hE1, Ω1 ,
{
∆hE1 ∈ CM+1×1 : ‖∆hE1‖ ≤ ǫ1
}
, (18a)
hE2 = h¯E2 +∆hE2, Ω2 ,
{
∆hE2 ∈ CM+1×1 : ‖∆hE2‖ ≤ ǫ2
}
, (18b)
where h¯E1 =
[
h¯HRE, h¯UE
]H
and h¯E2 =
[
h¯HRE, h¯GE
]H
are the estimated CSI, and ∆hE1 and ∆hE2
represent the estimated errors for h¯E1 and h¯E2, respectively. The continuous sets Ω1 and Ω2
contain all possible CSI uncertainties with norms bounded by the uncertainty radii ǫ1 and ǫ2,
respectively.
C. Problem Formulation
Based on (10) and (15), the worst-case secrecy rates in time slot n in the DL and UL
transmissions can be respectively expressed as
Rdownsec [n] =
[
RUG[n]− max
∆hE1∈Ω1
RUE [n]
]+
, (19a)
Rupsec[n] =
[
RGU [n]− max
∆hE2∈Ω2
RGE [n]
]+
, (19b)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0). Hence, the average worst-case secrecy rate of the joint UL/DL RIS-
assisted UAV secure communication system is given by
Rsec =
1
N
N∑
n=1
{
wRdownsec [n] + (1− w)Rupsec[n]
}
. (20)
Our objective is to maximizeRsec by jointly optimizing the UAV’s trajectoryQ , {q[n], n ∈ N},
the phase-shift matrices Φd , {Θd[n], n ∈ N} and Φu , {Θu[n], n ∈ N} of the RIS, the UAV’s
transmit power p , {p[n], n ∈ N}, and the transmit power g , {g[n], n ∈ N} of the ground
user. Therefore, the problem can be formulated as
max
Q,Φd,Φu
p,g
Rsec (21a)
s.t. 0 ≤ θdi [n] < 2π, ∀n, i, (21b)
0 ≤ θui [n] < 2π, ∀n, i, (21c)
(1), (2), (11).
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It is observed that the constraints of problem (21) are all convex. However, it is still difficult
to solve problem (21) since the objective function of problem (21) is highly non-concave with
respect to Q, Φd, Φu, p, and g. In the next section, we develop an efficient algorithm to solve
problem (21).
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR JOINT UL/DL OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we focus on solving the joint UL/DL optimization problem (21). Based on
Lemma 1 in [4], it is known that the transmit power control design can guarantee RUG[n] −
max
∆hE1∈Ω1
RUE [n] ≥ 0 and RGU [n] − max
∆hE2∈Ω2
RGE [n] ≥ 0, since the optimal transmit power of
the UAV and the ground user in time slot n, denoted as pop[n] and gop[n], respectively, are zero
once the quality of the eavesdropping channels is better than that of the legitimate channels in
time slot n. Therefore, we reformulate problem (21) as
max
Q,Φd,Φu
p,g
1
N
N∑
n=1
{
wR˜downsec [n] + (1− w) R˜upsec[n]
}
(22)
s.t. (1), (2), (11), (21b), (21c).
where
R˜downsec [n] =
[
RUG[n]− max
∆hE1∈Ω1
RUE [n]
]
, and R˜upsec[n] =
[
RGU [n]− max
∆hE2∈Ω2
RGE [n]
]
.
As a result, the non-smoothness issue of problem (21) is addressed, and there exists no per-
formance loss in this step. However, problem (22) is still difficult to solve due to the coupled
optimization variables Q, Φd, Φu, p, and g in the objective function. To cope with this difficulty,
we propose an efficient algorithm based on the AO method. Specifically, we divide problem (22)
into three sub-problems:
1) The optimization of transmit power p and g under the given UAV trajectory Q and phase-
shift matrices Φd and Φu (referred to as sub-problem 1);
2) The optimization of phase-shift matrices Φd and Φu under the given UAV trajectory Q and
transmit power p and g (referred to as sub-problem 2);
3) The optimization of UAV trajectory Q under the given phase-shift matrices Φd and Φu and
transmit power p and g (referred to as sub-problem 3).
The details are presented in the next three subsections, and subsequently the overall algorithm
is summarized.
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A. Solution to Sub-Problem 1
For any givenQ,Φd, andΦu, we have h
H
G1HG1[n]v
d[n] = LUG[n]hUG+LURG[n]h
H
RGΘd[n]hUR[n]
and hHG2[n]HG2[n]v
u[n] = LUG[n]hGU+LURG[n]h
H
RU [n]Θu[n]hGR, where hG2[n] =
[
hHRU [n], hGU
]H
,
hG1 =
[
hHRG, hUG
]H
,HG1[n] = diag



LURG[n]hUR[n]
LUG[n]



, andHG2[n] = diag



LURG[n]hGR
LUG[n]



.
Then, sub-problem 1 can be expressed as
max
p,g
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wRpowerdown [n] + (1− 2)Rpowerup [n]
]
(23)
s.t. (2), (11)
where
Rpowerdown [n] = log2
(
1 +
p[n]
σ2
∣∣hHG1HG1[n]vd[n]∣∣2
)
− log2
(
1 + max
∆hE1∈Ω1
p[n]
σ2
∣∣hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣2
)
and
Rpowerup [n] = log2
(
1 +
g[n]
σ2
∣∣hHG2[n]HG2[n]vu[n]∣∣2
)
−log2
(
1 + max
∆hE2∈Ω2
g[n]
σ2
∣∣hHE2HE2vu[n]∣∣2
)
.
Infinitely many possible CSI uncertainties in Ω1 and Ω2 make problem (23) intractable. However,
the special structure of
∣∣hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣ and ∣∣hHE2HE2vu[n]∣∣ can be utilized to address this
problem. Let arg (x) denote the phase angle vector of x. We first have the following inequality:
∣∣hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣ ≤ ∣∣h¯HE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣ + ∣∣∆hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣ ,
where the equality holds if and only if arg
(
h¯HE1HE1[n]v
d[n]
)
= arg
(
∆hHE1HE1[n]v
d[n]
)
. Thus,
max
∆hE1∈Ω1
p[n]
∣∣hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣2 /σ2 can be transformed into
max
∆hE1
∣∣∆hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣2 (24a)
s.t. ‖∆hE1‖ ≤ ǫ1, (24b)
arg
(
h¯HE1HE1[n]v
d[n]
)
= arg
(
∆hHE1HE1[n]v
d[n]
)
. (24c)
Based on the constraints in (24c), the phase angle vector of the optimal ∆hE1[n]
1 in time slot
n, i.e., ∆hopE1[n], is given by
τ [n] = arg
(
HE1[n]v
d[n]
)− arg (h¯HE1HE1[n]vd[n]) . (25)
1Since the UAV’s location is time-varying, the worst-case setup of the eavesdropping channels is also tmie-varying. Thus, we
add time slot index n to ∆hE1[n].
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Furthermore, the magnitude vector of ∆hopE1[n] can be written as
m1[n] =
ǫ1
‖m2[n]‖m2[n], (26)
where m2[n] is the magnitude vector of HE1[n]v
d[n]. Therefore, the optimal ∆hE1[n] is
∆hopE1[n] = diag
([
ejτ1[n], ejτ2[n], · · · , ejτM+1[n]])m1[n], (27)
where τk[n] is the kth element of the phase angle vector τ [n], and k ∈ K = {1, · · · ,M + 1}.
∆hopE2[n] can also be obtained by using the above solution. With ∆h
op
E1[n] and ∆h
op
E2[n], problem
(23) can be rewritten as
max
p,g
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wR˜powerdown [n] + (1− w) R˜powerup [n]
]
(28)
s.t. (2), (11)
where
R˜powerdown [n] = log2 (1 + p[n]a1[n])− log2 (1 + p[n]b1[n]) ,
R˜powerup [n] = log2 (1 + g[n]a1[n])− log2 (1 + g[n]b2[n]) ,
a1[n] =
∣∣hHG1HG1[n]vd[n]∣∣2
σ2
, b1[n] =
∣∣∣(hopE1[n])HHE1[n]vd[n]∣∣∣2
σ2
,
a2[n] =
∣∣hHG2[n]HG2[n]vu[n]∣∣2
σ2
, b2[n] =
∣∣∣(hopE2[n])HHE2vu[n]∣∣∣2
σ2
,
h
op
E1[n] = h¯E1 +∆h
op
E1[n], and h
op
E2[n] = h¯E2 + ∆h
op
E2[n]. Similar to sub-problem 1 in [4], the
optimal solution of (28) is given by
pop[n] =


min
(
[p˜[n]]+ , Ppeak
)
, a1[n] > b1[n]
0, a1[n] ≤ b1[n]
, (29a)
gop[n] =


min
(
[g˜[n]]+ , Gpeak
)
, a2[n] > b2[n]
0, a2[n] ≤ b2[n]
, (29b)
where
p˜[n] =
√(
1
2b1[n]
− 1
2a1[n]
)2
+
1
̟1 ln 2
(
1
b1[n]
− 1
a1[n]
)
− 1
2b1[n]
− 1
2a1[n]
, (30a)
g˜[n] =
√(
1
2b2[n]
− 1
2a2[n]
)2
+
1
̟2 ln 2
(
1
b2[n]
− 1
a2[n]
)
− 1
2b2[n]
− 1
2a2[n]
. (30b)
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Note that ̟1 ≥ 0 and ̟2 ≥ 0 in (30) can be obtained via a one-dimensional bisection search,
which guarantees that the constraints in (2b) and (11b) are fulfilled when pop[n] and gop[n] are
attained, respectively.
B. Solution to Sub-Problem 2
For any given p, g, and Q, with the aid of the slack variables ξ1 = {ξ1[n]}Nn=1 and ξ2 =
{ξ2[n]}Nn=1, sub-problem 2 can be expressed as
max
vd[n],vu[n],
ξ1[n],ξ2[n]
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wRphidown[n] + (1− w)Rphiup [n]
]
(31a)
s.t. max
∆hE1∈Ω1
p[n]
σ2
∣∣hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣2 ≤ ξ1[n], ∀n, (31b)
max
∆hE2∈Ω2
g[n]
σ2
∣∣hHE2HE2vu[n]∣∣2 ≤ ξ2[n], ∀n, (31c)
|vdi [n]|, |vui [n]| = 1, ∀n, i, (31d)
where
Rphidown[n] =
[
log2
(
1 +
p[n]
σ2
∣∣hHG1HG1[n]vd[n]∣∣2
)
− log2 (1 + ξ1[n])
]
and
Rphiup [n] =
[
log2
(
1 +
g[n]
σ2
∣∣hHG2[n]HG2[n]vu[n]∣∣2
)
− log2 (1 + ξ2[n])
]
.
It is difficult to solve problem (31), since the constraints in (31b) and (31c) involve infinitely
many inequality constraints. To overcome this difficulty, we first substitute (18a) and (18b) into
(31b) and (31c), respectively, and obtain
∆hHE1∆hE1 − ǫ21 ≤ 0, (32a)
∆hHE2∆hE2 − ǫ22 ≤ 0, (32b)
p[n]
σ2
hHE1HE1[n]V
d[n]HHE1[n]hE1 − ξ1[n] ≤ 0, ∀n, (32c)
g[n]
σ2
hHE2HE2V
u[n]HHE2hE2 − ξ2[n] ≤ 0, ∀n, (32d)
where V d[n] = vd[n]vd[n]
H
and V u[n] = vu[n]vu[n]H . Both of the ranks of V d[n] and V u[n]
are one. Then, we transform the constraints in (31b) and (31c) into linear matrix inequalities
(LMIs) by using the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 (S-Procedure [36]:) Let a function fm(x), m ∈ {1, 2},x ∈ CN×1, be defined as
fm(x) = x
HBmx+ 2Re{bHmx}+ bm, (33)
where Bm ∈ HN , bm ∈ CN×1, and bm ∈ R1×1. Then, the implication f1(x) ≤ 0 ⇒ f2(x) ≤ 0
hold if and only if there exists a δ ≥ 0 such that
δ

B1 b1
bH1 b1

−

B2 b2
bH2 b2

  0, (34)
provided that there exists a point xˆ such that fm(xˆ) < 0.
Using Lemma 1, the following implications can be obtained: (32a)⇒ (32c) and (32b)⇒ (32d)
holds if and only if there exist η1[n] ≥ 0 and η2[n] ≥ 0 such that
U1[n]−U2[n]  0, (35a)
U3[n]−U4[n]  0, (35b)
where
U1[n] =

η1[n]IM+1 0
0 −η1[n]ǫ21 + ξ1[n]

 ,U3[n] =

η2[n]IM+1 0
0 −η2[n]ǫ22 + ξ2[n]

 ,
U2[n] =
p[n]
σ2

 HE1[n]V d[n]HHE1[n] HE1[n]V d[n]HHE1[n]h¯E1
h¯HE1HE1[n]V
d[n]HHE1[n] h¯
H
E1HE1[n]V
d[n]HHE1[n]h¯E1

 ,
U4[n] =
g[n]
σ2

 HE2V u[n]HHE2 HE2V u[n]HHE2h¯E2
h¯HE2HE2V
u[n]HHE2 h¯
H
E2HE2V
u[n]HHE2h¯E2

 ,
and IM+1 denotes the (M + 1) × (M + 1) identity matrix. Since the unit-modulus constraints
in (31d) are non-convex, we apply the SDR method to relax the constraints. We have
∣∣hHG1HG1[n]vd[n]∣∣2 = hHG1HG1[n]V d[n]HHG1[n]hG1 = Tr (V d[n]A1[n])
and
∣∣hHG2[n]HG2[n]vu[n]∣∣2 = hHG2[n]HG2[n]V u[n]HHG2[n]hG2[n] = Tr (V u[n]A2[n]) ,
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where A1[n] = H
H
G1[n]hG1h
H
G1HG1[n], A2[n] = H
H
G2[n]hG2[n]h
H
G2[n]HG2[n], and Tr (X) de-
notes the trace of X . Thus, problem (31) can be reformulated as
max
V d[n],V u[n],ξ1[n],
ξ2[n],η1[n],η2[n]
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wR˜phidown[n] + (1− w) R˜phiup [n]
]
(36a)
s.t. η1[n], η2[n] ≥ 0, ∀n, (36b)
V d[n],V u[n]  0, ∀n, (36c)
V dr,r[n],V
u
r,r[n] = 1, r = 1, · · · ,M + 1, ∀n. (36d)
(35),
where
R˜phidown[n] =
[
log2
(
1 +
p[n]
σ2
Tr
(
V d[n]A1[n]
))− log2 (1 + ξ1[n])
]
,
R˜phiup [n] =
[
log2
(
1 +
g[n]
σ2
Tr (V u[n]A2[n])
)
− log2 (1 + ξ2[n])
]
,
and V dr,r[n] and V
u
r,r[n] denote the (r, r)th element of V
d[n] and V u[n], respectively. It is still diffi-
cult to obtain the optimal solution of problem (36), since − log2 (1 + ξ1[n]) and − log2 (1 + ξ2[n])
are not concave with respect to ξ1[n] and ξ1[n], respectively. Nevertheless, it is known that the
first-order Taylor expansion of a concave function is its global over-estimator and that of a
convex function is its global under-estimator. Therefore, we apply the SCA method to solve
problem (36). The first-order Taylor expansions of log2 (1 + ξ1[n]) and log2 (1 + ξ2[n]) at the
given points ξ1,0 = {ξ1,0[n]}Nn=1 and ξ2,0 = {ξ2,0[n]}Nn=1 can be respectively expressed as
log2 (1 + ξ1[n]) ≤ log2 (1 + ξ1,0[n]) +
1
ln 2 (1 + ξ1,0[n])
(ξ1[n]− ξ1,0[n]) , (37)
log2 (1 + ξ2[n]) ≤ log2 (1 + ξ2,0[n]) +
1
ln 2 (1 + ξ2,0[n])
(ξ2[n]− ξ2,0[n]) . (38)
Then, problem (36) can be approximated as
max
V d[n],V u[n],ξ1[n],
ξ2[n],η1[n],η2[n]
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wRˆphidown[n] + (1− w) Rˆphiup [n]
]
(39)
s.t. (35), (36b), (36c), (36d),
where
Rˆphidown[n] =
[
log2
(
1 +
p[n]
σ2
Tr
(
V d[n]A1[n]
))− ξ1[n]
ln 2 (1 + ξ1,0[n])
]
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and
Rˆphiup [n] =
[
log2
(
1 +
g[n]
σ2
Tr (V u[n]A2[n])
)
− ξ2[n]
ln 2 (1 + ξ2,0[n])
]
.
It is observed that problem (39) is a convex optimization problem, and thus can be solved
efficiently by using standard solvers, such as the CVX. However, we emphasize that a rank-one
solution may not be obtained. Hence, we use the Gaussian randomization method [23] to recover
vd[n] and vu[n] from V d[n] and V u[n], respectively, which is similar to that in [23] and thus
omitted here for brevity.
C. Solution to Sub-Problem 3
For any given Φd, Φu, p, and g, we can express sub-problem 3 as
max
Q
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wRtrajdown[n] + (1− w) log2
(
1 +
g[n]
σ2
∣∣hHG2[n]HG2[n]vu[n]∣∣2
)]
(40)
s.t. (1),
where
Rtrajdown[n] = log2
(
1 +
p[n]
σ2
∣∣hHG1HG1[n]vd[n]∣∣2
)
−log2
(
1 + max
∆hE1∈Ω1
p[n]
σ2
∣∣hHE1HE1[n]vd[n]∣∣2
)
.
In particular, RGE [n] is not relevant to the UAV trajectory, and so we omit it in problem (40).
It is challenging to cope with the infinitely many ∆hE1. However, we note that the worst case
of the objective function can be obtained when the UAV trajectory is given, and that the UAV
trajectory can be optimized when the worst case of the wiretap channels, i.e., h
op
E1[n], is given.
Hence, we utilize the UAV trajectory of the (j − 1)th iteration to calculate the worst case setup
for the wiretap channels h
op
E1[n] in the jth iteration, and this is obtained by using a procedure
similar to (27). Besides, from (4)-(7), it is worth noting that not only LUG[n], LUE [n], LURG[n],
and LURE [n] but also h
LoS
UR [n] is relevant to the UAV trajectory. However, from the structure of
hLoSUR [n] in (4), it is observed that h
LoS
UR [n] is complex and non-linear with respect to the UAV
trajectory variables, which makes the UAV trajectory design intractable. To handle such difficulty,
we use the UAV trajectory of the (j− 1)th iteration to obtain an approximate hLoSUR [n] in the jth
iteration. Similarly, the NLoS component of hRU [n] in the jth iteration is also designed by the
above same procedure. Then, by introducing the slack variables u = {u[n]}Nn=1, e = {e[n]}Nn=1,
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s = {s[n]}Nn=1, t = {t[n]}Nn=1, ζ = {ζ [n]}Nn=1, rd = {rd[n]}Nn=1, and ru = {ru[n]}Nn=1, we
transform problem (40) into the following problem,
max
Q,u,e,s,
t,ζ,rd,ru
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wR˜trajdown[n] + (1− w) log2 (1 + ργ1[n]ru[n])
]
(41a)
s.t. x2[n] + x2G + y
2[n] + y2G − 2xGx[n]− 2yGy[n] + z2U − (u[n])−
4
κ ≤ 0, ∀n, (41b)
x2[n] + x2R + y
2[n] + y2R − 2xRx[n]− 2yRy[n] + (zU − zR)2 − (e[n])−
4
α ≤ 0, ∀n, (41c)
(s[n])−
4
κ − x2[n]− x2E − y2[n]− y2E + 2xEx[n] + 2yEy[n]− z2U ≤ 0, ∀n, (41d)
(t[n])−
4
α − x2[n]− x2R − y2[n]− y2R + 2xRx[n] + 2yRy[n]− (zU − zR)2 ≤ 0, ∀n, (41e)
ργ0[n]h
T
st[n]HQE [n]hst[n] ≤ ζ [n], ∀n, (41f)
hTue[n]HQG[n]hue[n] ≥ rd[n], ∀n, (41g)
hTue[n]HGQ[n]hue[n] ≥ ru[n], ∀n, (41h)
s[n] ≤
√
(zU − zE)−κ, t[n] ≤
√
(zU − zR)−α, ∀n, (41i)
(1),
where
R˜trajdown[n] = log2 (1 + ργ0[n]rd[n])− log2 (1 + ζ [n]) ,
hue[n] = [u[n], e[n]]
T , hst[n] = [s[n], t[n]]
T ,
HQG[n] =
[
hHUG,
√
(dRG)−αh
H
UR[n]Θ
H
d [n]hRG
]H [
hHUG,
√
(dRG)−αh
H
UR[n]Θ
H
d [n]hRG
]
,
HGQ[n] =
[
hHGU ,
√
(dRG)−αh
H
GRΘ
H
u [n]hRU [n]
]H [
hHGU ,
√
(dRG)−αh
H
GRΘ
H
u [n]hRU [n]
]
,
HQE[n] =

 hopUE [n]√
(dRE)−α (h
op
RE [n])
H
Θd[n]hUR[n]



 hopUE [n]√
(dRE)−α (h
op
RE[n])
H
Θd[n]hUR[n]


H
,
γ0[n] = p[n]/σ
2, and γ1[n] = g[n]/σ
2. In particular, the constraints (41b)-(41e), (41g), and
(41h) are non-convex feasible regions, and − log2 (1 + ζ [n]) is non-concave with respect to ζ [n].
We use the SCA technique to address the non-convexity of these constraints. The first-order
Taylor expansions of −x2[n], −y2[n], (u[n])− 4κ , (e[n])− 4α , log2 (1 + ζ [n]), hTue[n]HQG[n]hue[n],
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Algorithm 1 Proposed algorithm for solving problem (21)
1: Initialization:
Set the initial feasible points Ξ0 = {Q(0),Φ(0)d ,Φ(0)u ,p(0), g(0),u0, e0, ξ1,0, ξ2,0, ζ0}. Set
iteration index j = 0 and R
(0)
sec.
2: repeat
3: Set j ← j + 1;
4: With given Q(j−1), p(j−1), g(j−1), Φ
(j−1)
d , Φ
(j−1)
u , u0, e0, and ζ0, update Q
(j), u(j), e(j),
and ζ(j) by solving problem (43);
5: Set u0 = u
(j), e0 = e
(j), and ζ0 = ζ
(j);
6: With given Q(j), p(j−1), g(j−1), ξ1,0, and ξ2,0, update Φ
(j)
d , Φ
(j)
u , ξ
(j)
1 , and ξ
(j)
2 by solving
problem (39);
7: Set ξ1,0 = ξ
(j)
1 and ξ2,0 = ξ
(j)
2 ;
8: With given Q(j), Φ
(j)
d , and Φ
(j)
u update p
(j) and g(j) by using (29);
9: With given Q(j), Φ
(j)
d , Φ
(j)
u , p
(j), and g(j), compute R
(j)
sec;
10: until:
∣∣∣R(j)sec − R(j−1)sec ∣∣∣ ≤ ǫc or j > jmax.
and hTue[n]HGQ[n]hue[n] at the given feasible points x0 = {x0[n]}Nn=1, y0 = {y0[n]}Nn=1, u0 =
{u0[n]}Nn=1, e0 = {e0[n]}Nn=1, ζ0 = {ζ0[n]}Nn=1, and Hue,0 = {hue,0[n]}Nn=1 are given by
hTue[n]HQG[n]hue[n] ≥ −hTue,0[n]HQG[n]hue,0[n] + 2ℜ
[
hTue,0[n]HQG[n]hue[n]
]
, (42a)
hTue[n]HGQ[n]hue[n] ≥ −hTue,0[n]HGQ[n]hue,0[n] + 2ℜ
[
hTue,0[n]HGQ[n]hue[n]
]
, (42b)
log2 (1 + ζ [n]) ≤ log2 (1 + ζ0[n]) +
1
ln 2 (1 + ζ0[n])
(ζ [n]− ζ0[n]) , (42c)
(u[n])−
4
κ ≥ (u0[n])−
4
κ − 4
κ
(u0[n])
−
4
κ
−1 (u[n]− u0[n]) , (42d)
(e[n])−
4
α ≥ (e0[n])−
4
α − 4
α
(e0[n])
−
4
α
−1 (e[n]− e0[n]) , (42e)
−x2[n] ≤ x20[n]− 2x0[n]x[n], (42f)
−y2[n] ≤ y20[n]− 2y0[n]y[n]. (42g)
Accordingly, problem (41) can be approximately transformed into
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max
Q,u,e,s,
t,ζ,rd,ru
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
wRˆtrajdown[n] + (1− w) log2 (1 + ργ1[n]ru[n])
]
(43a)
s.t. x2[n] + x2G + y
2[n] + y2G − 2xGx[n]− 2yGy[n] + z2U −
(
1 +
4
κ
)
(u0[n])
−
4
κ
+
4
κ
(u0[n])
−
4
κ
−1 u[n] ≤ 0, ∀n, (43b)
x2[n] + x2R + y
2[n] + y2R − 2xRx[n]− 2yRy[n] + (zU − zR)2 −
(
1 +
4
α
)
(e0[n])
−
4
α
+
4
α
(e0[n])
−
4
α
−1 e[n] ≤ 0, ∀n, (43c)
(s[n])−
4
κ + x20[n]− 2x0[n]x[n] − x2E + y20[n]− 2y0[n]y[n]− y2E + 2xEx[n]
+ 2yEy[n]− z2U ≤ 0, ∀n, (43d)
(t[n])−
4
α + x20[n]− 2x0[n]x[n]− x2R + y20[n]− 2y0[n]y[n]− y2R + 2xRx[n]
+ 2yRy[n]− (zU − zR)2 ≤ 0, ∀n, (43e)
rd[n] + h
T
ue,0[n]HQG[n]hue,0[n]− 2ℜ
[
hTue,0[n]HQG[n]hue[n]
] ≤ 0, ∀n, (43f)
ru[n] + h
T
ue,0[n]HGQ[n]hue,0[n]− 2ℜ
[
hTue,0[n]HGQ[n]hue[n]
] ≤ 0, ∀n, (43g)
(1), (41f), (41i),
where
Rˆtrajdown[n] = log2 (1 + ργ0[n]rd[n])−
ζ [n]
ln 2 (1 + ζ0[n])
.
Problem (43) is a convex optimization problem, and thus the CVX solver can be used for solution.
D. Overall Algorithm
With the proposed solutions to the three sub-problems, the overall algorithm for solving
problem (21) is summarized in Algorithm 1. Solving sub-problem 2 and sub-problem 3 by
using the interior-point method dominates the complexity of Algorithm 1. Based on the results
in [28] and [44], the computational complexities of solving sub-problem 2 and sub-problem 3 are
Osub2
(
2
√
M + 1 log (1/ǫc)
(
2N (M + 1)3 + 4N2 (M + 1)2 + 8N3
))
andOsub3
(
(8N)3.5 log (1/ǫc)
)
,
respectively. Hence, the overall complexity of solving problem (21) is Osub2+Osub3. Furthermore,
as shown in Fig. 2, we observe that the proposed algorithm can quickly converge.
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IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to verify the validity of the proposed algorithm
(denoted as JO) for the joint UL/DL optimization. The following benchmark algorithms are used
for comparison:
• Robust design of the UAV trajectory and transmit power without passive beamforming
(denoted as JO/NPB).
• Robust design of the heuristic trajectory, transmit power, and passive beamforming (denoted
as JO/HT).
• Non-robust design of the UAV trajectory, passive beamforming, and transmit power (denoted
as JO/NR).
Specifically, “heuristic trajectory” refers to a preset trajectory where the UAV first flies directly
to the ground user at the maximum speed, then hovers above the user as long as possible, and
finally flies to the final location at its maximum speed for the rest of the flight time. Also, for
the considered JO/NR algorithm, the estimated CSI of the eavesdropping channels is regarded
as the accurate CSI. Hence, it is a special case of our proposed algorithm that is obtained
by setting ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 0. From the definitions of the uncertainty radii ǫ1 and ǫ2 in [28], the
maximum normalized estimation error of the eavesdropping links is defined as δl = ǫl/‖h¯El‖,
where l ∈ {1, 2}. Since the UAV usually flies higher than the RIS, the ground user and the
eavesdropper in the DL transmission, the Rician factors for the U-G and U-E links are set to
βUG = βUE = 10 dB, while the Rician factors for the R-G, R-E, and U-R links are set to
βUR = βRG = βRE = 3 dB. The corresponding Rician factors in the UL transmission are
similar to the DL transmission, i.e., βGU = 10 dB and βRU = βGR = βGE = 3 dB. The
initial feasible solutions of our proposed JO algorithm is given by the JO/HT algorithm. The
remaining parameters are as follows: q0 = [−500, 20]T m, qF = [500, 20]T m, wG = [0, 120]T
m, wE = [200, 150]
T m, wR = [0, 0]
T m, zU = 100 m, zR = 40 m, vmax = 30 m/s, δt = 1 s,
M = Mx ×My = 6 × 5, σ2 = −80 dBm, d = λ2 , α = 2.2, κ = 3.3, ς = 3.4, ρ = −30 dB,
ǫc = 10
−3, jmax = 40, Ppeak = 4P¯ , and Gpeak = 4G¯. In paticular, we assume that all wiretap
channels have the same maximum normalized estimation error variance, namely, δ1 = δ2 = δa.
Fig. 2 plots the average worst-case secrecy rate of the proposed algorithm versus iteration
number under different flight periods with w = 0.5, δ2a = 0.5 and P¯ = G¯ = 20 dBm. It is
observed that our proposed algorithm can quickly converge after around 10 iterations, and the
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Fig. 2. Average worst-case secrecy rate versus iteration number
average worst-case secrecy rate increases with the increasing flight time T .
In Fig. 3, we illustrate the UAV trajectories based on different algorithms for T = 124 s,
δ2a = 0.5, P¯ = G¯ = 20 dBm, and w = 0.5. Fig. 3(a), Fig. 3(b), and Fig. 3(c) show more than
100 UAV trajectories2 by using the JO, JO/NPB and JO/NR algorithms, respectively, when T is
sufficiently large (e.g., T = 124 s). As for the JO/NPB algorithm, the UAV first flies directly to
a certain location where the UAV is close to the ground user and away from the eavesdropper as
much as possible, then hovers as long as possible, and finally flies along a relatively direct path
to the final location in order to avoid being eavesdropped. By contrast, for the JO and JO/NR
algorithms, the UAV tends to fly along an arc path to a certain location between the ground
user and the RIS, then it hovers as long as possible, and finally reaches the final location.
This is because the JO and JO/NR algorithms balance the channel gains between the direct
links (i.e., the U-G, U-E, G-U, and G-E links) and reflecting links (i.e., the U-R-G, U-R-E,
G-R-U, and G-R-E links) in each time slot in order to choose a trajectory, so as to achieve
the best communication quality. Besides, since the JO algorithm takes the CSI uncertainty into
account, the UAV trajectories of the JO algorithm under different channel realizations are more
decentralized than those of the JO/NR algorithm under different channel realizations.
In Fig. 4, we show the average worst-case secrecy rates for different algorithms versus T with
2Since all channels are modeled by the Rician fading channel model, the optimized UAV trajectories in different random
independent realizations of all channels are different. Hence, for different algorithms, we draw more than 100 UAV trajectories
to show the general trajectory trends of them.
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(c) The UAV trajectory of the JO/NR algorithm
Fig. 3. UAV trajectories by using different algorithms with T = 124 s, δ2a = 0.5, P¯ = G¯ = 20 dBm, and w = 0.5
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Fig. 4. Average worst-case sccrecy rate performance by different algorithms versus T
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Fig. 5. Average worst-case secrecy rate versus the maximum normalized channel estimation error variance
w = 0.5, δ2a = 0.5, and P¯ = G¯ = 20 dBm. At the hovering location, the trade-off between
enhancing the quality of the legitimate links and weakening the quality of the eavesdropping
links is achieved for the UAV. Therefore, the maximum secrecy rate is achieved at the hovering
location and the longer the UAV remains static at the hovering location, the larger the average
worst-case secrecy rate is. This is the reason why the average worst-case secrecy rates of all
the algorithms increase with T . In particular, our proposed algorithm exceeds all the benchmark
schemes. This shows that, with the aid of the proposed robust joint design of UAV trajectory,
RIS’s passive beamforming, and transmit power control, the secrecy rate performance can be
effectively improved. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the JO/NR algorithm outperforms
the other benchmark algorithms in which there exist the robust UAV trajectory or RIS’s passive
beamforming designs in these algorithms. This demonstrates that even though the CSI uncertainty
of the eavesdropping channels is not taken into account, which leads to inaccurate optimization,
such joint design of the UAV trajectory, passive beamforming, and transmit power can still
achieve a considerable gain, as compared with the counterpart schemes.
In Fig. 5, we investigate the average worst-case secrecy rates for different algorithms versus δ2a
with w = 0.5, T = 124 s, and P¯ = G¯ = 20 dBm. We observe that the average worst-case secrecy
rates of all the algorithms decrease as the CSI uncertainty of the wiretap channels increases.
This is because large values of the CSI uncertainty of the wiretap channels make it more difficult
to achieve a robust design. However, capitalizing on the proposed robust joint design, the JO
algorithm can avoid the information leakage more efficiently than the other benchmark schemes.
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Hence, our proposed scheme can achieve an apparent performance improvement. Furthermore,
the secrecy rate performance of the JO algorithm exceed that of the JO/NR algorithm, which
demonstrates that our proposed algorithm is robust. In addition, it is observed that although the
CSI estimation errors of the eavesdropping links are not taken into account, the average worst-
case secrecy rate of the JO/NR algorithm still exceeds that of the other benchmark schemes.
Once again, this demonstrates that the joint design of the UAV trajectory, passive beamforming,
and transmit power achieves a substantial gain. Besides, it is worth noting that the secrecy
rate performance of the JO/NPB algorithm is close to that of the JO/HT algorithm when δ2a
is sufficiently large (e.g., δ2a = 0.5). This is mainly because too large CSI uncertainty leads
to the failure of RIS’s passive beamforming, even to the reverse effect. By contrast, large CSI
uncertainty has a marginal effect on the trajectory or transmit power optimization, which is
demonstrated by the smooth curve of the JO/NPB algorithm in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 6, we show the UAV trajectories by different time slot division setups, w, with T = 124
s, δ2a = 0.5, and P¯ = G¯ = 20 dBm. In particular, w = 0.1 means that we pay more attention to the
UL communications, while w = 0.9 means that we focus more on the DL communications. Since
RGE [n] is independent of the UAV trajectory, in the UL communications, the UAV trajectory
is only designed for the maximum of the achievable rate RGU [n]. Hence, for w = 0.1, the
UL communication is dominant, and the JO algorithm almost achieves the trade-off between
the channel gains of the G-U link and G-R-U link to chose a trajectory, so as to achieve the
best communication quality. when w increases, the DL communication becomes more and more
dominant, it is more important for the JO algorithm to balance the channel gains between the
U-G link and U-R-G link and between the U-E link and U-R-E link to design the UAV trajectory.
Hence, the JO algorithm not only considers how to increase the legitimate rates between the
UAV and the ground user, but also considers how to decrease the wiretap rate from the UAV
to the eavesdropper. This is also the reason why the first half paths, i.e., the paths from the
initial location to the hovering location, when w = 0.9 are more decentralized that that when
w = 0.1. Besides, in the second half paths, i.e., the paths from the hovering location to the final
location, the UAV is more closer to the eavesdropper than in the first half paths. Thus, when
w is sufficiently large (e.g., w = 0.9), the UAV trajectories are inclined to fly along relatively
direct paths to the final location, so as to avoid the information leakage and increase the secrecy
rate.
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Fig. 6. UAV trajectories of the JO algorithm by different w with T = 124 s, δ2a = 0.5, P¯ = G¯ = 20 dBm
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a novel RIS-assisted UAV secure communication, aiming at integrat-
ing RIS and UAV technologies for improving the system secrecy rate. In particular, a single flight
time slot is allocated to the DL and UL transmissions between the UAV and the ground user,
while the legitimate channels were wiretapped by an eavesdropper. Since the eavesdroppers
always avoid being detected by the legitimate transmitter, the acquisition of the CSI of the
eavesdropping channels is usually imperfect. Thus, we focused our attention on the joint and
CSI-robust design of the UAV’s trajectory, RIS’s passive beamforming, and transmit power
of the legitimate transmitter in order to maximize the average worst-case secrecy rate of the
considered communication system. Although the formulated problem was intractable due to its
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non-convexity, we proposed an efficient algorithm to approximately solve it by applying the AO,
SCA, S-procedure, and SDR techniques. Simulation results demonstrated that the assistance of
a RIS is beneficial to substantially improve the secrecy rate performance, and the joint design
of UAV trajectory, RIS’s passive beamforming, transmit power of the legitimates can achieve
a substantial gain. In addition, the robustness of our proposed algorithm was confirmed with
respect to inaccurate estimates of the CSI of the wiretap channels.
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